ESTABLISHING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN FRAGILE STATES THROUGH RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS LESSONS FROM IRAQ by unknown
ESTABLISHING GOOD GOVERNANCE 
IN FRAGILE STATES THROUGH 
RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 
LESSONS FROM IRAQ
Seiki Tanaka 
Masanori Yoshikawa
GLOBAL ECONOMY & DEVELOPMENT 
WORKING PAPER 56 | JANUARY 2013
Global Economy
and Development
at BROOKINGS
Global Economy
and Development
at BROOKINGS
Seiki Tanaka is a research assistant professor at the 
Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism 
at Syracuse University.
Masanori Yoshikawa is a representative of the Iraq 
Office at the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA).
Acknowledgements:
We would like to thank the officials of the government of Iraq, the United Nations Development Program Iraq, 
JICA Headquarters and the JICA Iraq Office for their invaluable assistance and collaboration, and scholars at the 
Brookings Institution for their useful comments.
Abstract:
Countries in transition often go through periods of upheaval and weak governance and Iraq is a prime example. 
Usually donor agencies hesitate to increase their support as they face two key problems in post-conflict or post-
revolution situations: (1) high security risk for transparent implementation; and (2) poor government effectiveness, 
marred by corruption, ethnic tensions and economic stagnation. But this is precisely the time when donor engage-
ment is needed most. By using the experience of JICA projects in Iraq, we argue that donors should not withdraw 
their support in difficult post-conflict situations. The paper proposes three mechanisms – information; social rec-
ognition; and mediation mechanisms – to solve such difficulties in a post-conflict society. The empirical analysis 
shows that more intensive communication between donor and government officials especially leads to a positive 
impact even in war-torn Iraq. 
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INTRODUCTION
Some of the Arab countries currently going through democratic transition (e.g. Yemen) have 
experienced conflict and a collapse of some key insti-
tutions.  They exhibit a number of the characteristics 
of fragile states.  There is concern that this may lead 
to a decline in the volume of aid going to them at a 
time when they need it most.  Aid can harm develop-
ing countries by distorting their incentive systems, es-
pecially when there is not an appropriate environment 
in which it can work.  Particularly in weak, fragile gov-
ernments, aid can be diverted by corrupt bureaucrats 
and politicians and have no positive effect on political 
stability and economic growth (Burnside and Dollar 
2000; Collier and Dollar 2002). 
Accordingly, the idea that good governance is a nec-
essary prerequisite for aid to be effective has become 
a stylized fact (Epstein and Gang 2009).2  In the past 
decade, the strengthening of good governance in 
developing countries has been both an objective of 
and a condition for development assistance.  Further, 
while donors did not hesitate to implement large-scale 
projects in those countries with weak governance 
during the Cold War, a recent trend of development 
assistance to such countries is to start from small-
scale projects rather than risk losing the investment 
to corruption or incompetence.  Figure 1 vividly shows 
the decreasing trend in aid disbursement to countries 
with weak governments after the end of the Cold War.
This paper, in contrast to the recent trend, proposes 
that aid can have a positive impact in a fragile state 
if certain conditions are met.  Of course, the idea 
that aid sometimes results in increased political and 
economic development is not new (e.g., Clist and 
Morrissey 2011; Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 2004). 
For instance, Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue that 
foreign aid raises economic growth in a good policy 
environment,3 while Kosack (2004) finds that aid can 
improve the quality of life in democracies.  However, 
since most previous research employs a cross-country 
analysis with macro indicators, we still do not know 
what kinds of micro-level factors explain the positive 
relationship between economic aid and the recipi-
ent nation’s development.  Further, given that donors 
tend to avoid disbursing aid to fragile states, analyses 
focusing on fragile states are scarce, with little being 
known about what leads to positive results in such 
circumstances.
2 GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
In contrast, by examining the successful implementa-
tion of aid projects in Iraq by Japan’s aid agency, the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the 
paper identifies under what conditions aid can work 
in a fragile state.  Although we may limit the external 
validity of our analysis by focusing on only one case, 
the existence of unique observational data, which 
include interviews, allows us to come close to iden-
tifying which micro-level indicators lead to a positive 
impact of aid in a fragile state.  Whereas our observa-
tional data raise endogeneity concerns, the paper at-
tempts to establish a relationship between the JICA’s 
interventions and the outcome by testing competing 
hypotheses.
We argue that the JICA project in Iraq results in posi-
tive development because (1) the quantity and quality 
of the donor’s involvement is high; (2) there exists 
a social recognition system in the recipient govern-
ment that evaluates their achievements in front of 
their peers; and/or (3) a neutral mediator facilitates 
the communication between the donor and recipient 
Figure 1: Long-Term Trend in Aid Disbursement by Quality of Government
Source: Aid data are derived from the World Bank, while government data are taken from Polity IV project (2011).1
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agencies. By using a time-series analysis with novel 
micro-level indicators, we test the first two hypoth-
eses, and, due to data limitations, we conduct a bi-
variate analysis to examine the impact of a third party 
presence.
In order to examine the hypotheses, we first need to 
demonstrate that JICA projects in Iraq leads to posi-
tive results — although the purpose of our analysis is 
not to examine whether the JICA projects worked. 
Then, after confirming that the project is a success-
ful case, in terms of whether Iraqi officials become 
more efficient, we investigate what mechanisms led 
to positive aid impact in Iraq.  Ultimately, by extracting 
mechanisms from the case study, we aim to general-
ize our findings to other cases.  In other words, we 
believe that our attempt to identify the mechanism(s) 
not only helps accelerate post-conflict reconstruc-
tion efforts in Iraq, but is also of critical importance 
to policymakers and social scientists alike, in order to 
implement large-scale projects and reestablish good 
governance in other countries.
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section 
discusses difficulties in project management in post-
conflict societies.  The third section reviews three 
pillars of the JICA projects in Iraq: (1) increased inter-
action between donor and recipient; (2) a multilayer 
structure with a high-level authority in the recipient 
country; and (3) the presence of a third party en-
tity to facilitate project management.  By employing 
JICA and World Bank data, the fourth section exam-
ines whether the JICA project in Iraq was successful. 
Drawing on existing studies and field interviews, the 
fifth section proposes six hypotheses derived from 
the three pillars of the JICA project in Iraq.  The sixth 
section describes our research design and data em-
ployed in our analyses.  The seventh section reports 
our regression analyses and finally we conclude in the 
eighth section.
4 GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
DIFFICULTIES OF POST-CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION
This section reviews what kinds of difficulties a donor 
country faces in a post-conflict society.  The review 
will help us understand the peculiar characteristics 
of the JICA projects in Iraq that we will explain in the 
next section.
A donor would generally encounter two main chal-
lenges in a post-conflict society where the governance 
structure has been destroyed.  First of all, there  are 
considerable security risks.  Not only do donors face 
recurrent terrorist attacks and/or a high crime rate, 
but they also face a risk that conflict itself will resume. 
By one conservative estimate, 36 percent of civil wars 
that ended between 1945 and 1996 were followed by 
an additional war (Walter 2004).  This implies that a 
donor has significant difficulty in maintaining a local 
office in post-conflict societies, and even if the donor 
establishes an office, donor officials are more likely 
to remain in the office rather than in the field due to 
security risks.
Second, and not necessarily due to a conflict, war-torn 
countries historically have not had good governance 
records ex ante; the governments did not have the 
capacity to govern because of political and adminis-
trative weaknesses, corruption, ethnic tensions and 
conflict, economic depression, financial crises or 
totalitarianism.  These reasons are frequently cited 
as factors that explain why external or indigenous 
efforts at regime change occurred in the first place 
(Rondinelli and Montgomery 2005).  To make matters 
worse, during the previous authoritarian regime or 
civil war, the normal incentive to maintain a reputation 
for honesty is often disrupted, switching the society 
into a persistent high-corruption equilibrium (Tirole 
1996).  In the end, donors often have to improve or 
rebuild government capacity for public services from 
scratch, while facing significant security risks.4 
Given the anticipated difficulties (i.e., security risk 
and underdeveloped government capacity), the World 
Bank and other donors tend to avoid investing in some 
post-conflict societies, although the media selec-
tively captures cases and/or moments where donors 
pledged to disburse a bulk of aid such as Afghanistan, 
East Timor and Bosnia.  Yet, in reality, as Flores and 
Nooruddin (2009) point out, donors such as the World 
Bank tend to select aid recipients according to their 
probability of conflict recurrence.
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RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN 
IRAQ
Iraq is a typical example of a fragile country that is 
reconstructing without an effective government or 
political stability.  After the Iraq war, the first elec-
tion was observed in 2005, and the violence in Iraq 
has decreased and foreign commercial activities have 
become more vibrant since 2007.  Yet, despite signs 
of improvement, the country still faces instability in 
political, security and economic situations.  According 
to the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World 
Bank (2011), Iraq is ranked 20th from the bottom af-
ter Liberia and the Republic of the Congo in terms of 
government effectiveness, and fifth after Sudan and 
Afghanistan in terms of political stability.  In addition, 
in Iraq’s case, government officials have less knowl-
edge and experience in international commercial ac-
tivities due to decades of economic sanction, further 
discouraging donors from implementing large-scale 
projects.
As a result, as Figure 2 shows, most donors avoid 
committing large amounts of aid toward Iraq, whereas 
Japan constitutes an exceptional case – JICA aid ac-
counts for 85  percent of all loans Iraq receives, while 
it accounts for 26.7 percent in total grants that Iraq 
has received since 2004.5
The initial platform was established in 2008 between 
the Iraqi government and JICA, and in 2009, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
joined the platform as a third-party fiduciary monitor-
ing agent and evaluator.  In total, the platform includes 
12 loan agreements amounting to $2.8 billion (subse-
quently, the number of loan agreements increased 
to 19), and covers various sectors such as electricity, 
transportation, water and sanitation, and oil.
While expecting to face difficulties in implementing 
large-scale projects in Iraq, Japan just did not write a 
blank check; rather, JICA came up with several mech-
anisms for aid to work in a war-torn society.  More 
specifically, in order to address the above-mentioned 
difficulties, JICA and the Iraqi government agreed to 
introduce a unique monitoring platform composed 
of the following three pillars: increased interaction; 
a multilayer structure; and the presence of UNDP. 
Before explaining our hypotheses, we explain each pil-
lar in more detail.
Increased Interactions
First, given that one expected difficulty in implemen-
tation was insufficient knowledge and experience re-
garding international standards, JICA increased the 
level of interaction with the recipient.  More specifi-
cally, JICA agreed with project entities to set up a proj-
ect management team (PMT) for each project, which 
consists of local officials.  Whereas typically there 
would be high turnover rates among local officials in 
a fragile state, JICA asked the Iraqi government to 
maintain the same officials in a PMT for the long term. 
Then, JICA asked each PMT to submit a project prog-
ress report every month. JICA then reviews the report 
carefully and provides detailed feedback.  The prog-
ress report and feedback cover important aspects of 
project management and contribute to establishing 
the project management framework.  Since Iraqi offi-
cials did not have much experience and/or knowledge 
in project management with international finance or-
ganizations due to decades of conflicts and economic 
sanctions, the increased interactions between JICA 
and Iraqi officials and the provision of constructive 
feedback were expected to direct communication 
between JICA and project entities to the important 
issues in project implementation and increase the ef-
fectiveness of project implementation.
6 GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Figure 2: Aid Commitment to Iraq by Country and Type
Source: Author based on Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Co-operation and  
Development.
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Multilayer Structure
Second, to facilitate PMT’s activity in project imple-
mentation, JICA further introduced a multilayer moni-
toring system.  To increase the degree of monitoring, 
JICA agreed with the Iraqi government’s high-level au-
thority and oversight agencies such as the prime min-
ister’s Advisory Commission, the  Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Planning, to establish a committee 
to oversee the reconstruction projects periodically.  A 
quarterly monitoring meeting represents the multi-
layer structure.  In this quarterly monitoring meeting, 
project entities are expected to discuss best practices 
and common problems, while JICA, the high-level 
authority and oversight agencies evaluate project 
entities based on measureable factors of their perfor-
mance.  More specifically, in the quarterly monitoring 
meeting, the latter three institutions praise PMTs that 
had good performance records, while they prod PMTs 
that have bad performance records. 
Presence of UNDP
Third, while there is a need to increase monitoring 
in situations like post-conflict Iraq, limited access to 
project entities due to security concerns often leads 
to ineffective and time-consuming project manage-
ment (e.g., communicating only with official letters). 
In contrast, by collaborating with the UNDP, which 
has direct access to project entities even in war-torn 
countries, JICA attempted to solve such accessibility 
problems.  UNDP plays a unique role in this monitor-
ing mechanism, as actual problems in implementation 
are captured through direct access, rather than via 
emails or phone calls.  Based on the findings, they 
provide analyses and evaluations in monthly reports 
and quarterly monitoring meetings.  Further, in addi-
tion to their physical advantage, it appears that the 
presence of UNDP alleviated an unequal relationship 
between the donor and the recipient.  Such unbal-
anced relationships or feelings between donors and 
recipients are often observed in implementation of 
aid projects.  But being a recognized international or-
ganization, UNDP’s assessments are considered as an 
independent third party’s opinion, which contributes 
not only to maintaining a well-balanced relationship 
among stakeholders but also to improving effective-
ness of monitoring. 
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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JICA 
RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
This section examines the effectiveness of JICA’s 
reconstruction projects in Iraq in comparison with 
the World Bank’s projects and JICA’s other projects. 
Despite the anticipated difficulties, JICA’s reconstruc-
tion projects in Iraq have been implemented very well 
so far.  Though the effectiveness of aid projects is a 
multifaceted concept, the current analysis employs 
the degree of implementation efficiency of Iraqi offi-
cials to measure whether the JICA project has a posi-
tive impact. 
Any development project takes time from the begin-
ning to the end, but it sometimes takes a decade for 
completion due to many reasons, including a recipient 
country’s dysfunctional bureaucracy, and further de-
lay will be expected in a weak state.  Such delay has a 
non-negligible consequence on the development of a 
recipient country.  For instance, one of the JICA’s re-
construction projects in Iraq is to construct crude oil 
export pipelines and facilities.  Although Iraq is well-
known for rich proven oil reserves, its export are still 
limited because of the lack of export facilities.  The 
project aims to establish facilities to export nearly 
2 million barrels per day, which accounts for almost 
80 percent of Iraq’s current oil exports.  This means 
that if the construction of the oil export facilities were 
delayed one day, the expected cost would be $160 
million at $80 per barrel; $4.8 billion for one month’s 
delay.  As oil contributes a major portion of the Iraqi 
economy, this eventually affects the Iraqi people’s 
livelihoods.  Although we agree that efficiency may 
not be straightforwardly connected to the overall suc-
cess of an aid project, we believe that it can be one of 
the important indicators of project success.
Since JICA started its projects in Iraq, the efficiency 
of project management by Iraqi officials who are in 
charge of loan execution has improved.  For example, 
during the course of implementation, the average 
lapse of JICA’s review of documents on each procure-
ment process has become shorter, as shown in Table 
1, suggesting that the quality of the documents pre-
pared by the Iraqi government has improved and the 
completion of aid project will be faster.6  We assume 
that JICA’s work for the review process is constant, 
so a decrease in the lapse should indicate an improve-
ment of Iraqi officials’ submissions.
Further, to present counterfactual analyses, we com-
pare work efficiencies of JICA projects across dif-
ferent countries.  Comparing different projects by 
the same agency (JICA) allows us to reduce omitted 
variable bias caused by differences in donors.  Figure 
3 shows scatter plots of the efficiency of project man-
agement by the quality of government.  As a proxy 
for efficiency, the current analysis employs variables 
measuring how long a project takes to complete its as-
signment (same as Table 1).  
Table 1: Average Lapse Taken by JICA to Review Procurement Documents
2008-2009 2010 2011
P/Q Docs Average Lapse 41 14 N/A
P/Q Result Average Lapse 115 34 14
Bidding Docs Average Lapse 53 48 26
Bidding Result Average Lapse 32 29 42
Source: JICA.
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Although there is some variation, given that a pos-
sible selection bias leads to an underestimation for 
the fitted lines, we can see that the Iraq government 
manages JICA projects more effectively than average 
(except the top-right panel), suggesting that the ef-
ficiency improvement in Iraq shown in Table 1 is par-
tially supported.
Next, to corroborate the analysis, we compare work 
efficiencies of the JICA project in Iraq with the ones of 
the International Development Association’s projects 
in Iraq.  Though there are differences in donors and 
the nature of their projects, this can complement the 
analysis with the cross-country comparison among 
JICA projects.  Since the World Bank’s procedure to re-
view procurement documents may differ from JICA’s 
Source: Governance Indexes are derived from the World Bank, while JICA Project Effectiveness are taken from JICA.
Figure 3: Effectiveness of Project Management by Quality of Governance
Recipient’s Governance Index and JICA Project Effectiveness
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procedure, the current analysis employs the ratio 
between commitment and disbursement as a proxy 
of project efficiency, expecting that if Iraqi officials 
improve their quality of work, they are more likely to 
make more disbursements.  Figure 4 compares the 
indicators for both JICA and World Bank projects. 
According to the figure, efficiency rates improve over 
time for both the JICA projects and the World Bank’s 
projects.  However, the efficiency rate for the JICA 
projects exceeds the one for World Bank over time, 
while the efficiency rate for the World Bank’s projects 
are better than JICA’s at the beginning.7
Although the analysis is only univariate or bivariate, 
the evidence indicates that the JICA projects in Iraq 
can be considered an example of success.  However, 
the finding is less important than specifying why they 
are efficient, as it does not allow us to extract an un-
derlying mechanism and replicate it in other settings. 
Thus, the following sections attempt to identify how 
JICA’s projects contribute to the increased efficiency 
of the Iraqi government’s work.  The next section first 
introduces some generalizable hypotheses to explain 
the success of the JICA projects in Iraq.
Figure 4: Comparison in Project Efficiencies between JICA and the World 
Bank
Source: Author based on the World Bank and JICA.
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EXPLAINING EFFECTIVE AID 
IMPLEMENTATION IN A WEAK 
STATE
The previous section demonstrated that the JICA 
projects in Iraq are effective compared to other proj-
ects in similar settings.  Yet, it is still unclear why this 
is the case.  To learn from best practices and replicate 
them in other projects, we need to identify a causal re-
lationship that explains why the JICA projects in Iraq 
increase the effectiveness of PMT officials.  To identify 
the causal relationship, this section proposes hypoth-
eses connecting the interventions to the results.
Since JICA introduced the above-mentioned three 
monitoring mechanisms at the same time, it is dif-
ficult to disentangle them and determine which one 
led to the positive result.  To identify the mechanisms’ 
effects, we thus derive several hypotheses by drawing 
on existing studies.  By extracting distinct hypotheses, 
we attempt to differentiate which mechanism leads to 
the positive results in the JICA Iraq projects.
As reviewed above, JICA introduced three novel 
mechanisms in Iraq: increased interaction; a multi-
layer structure; and the presence of the UNDP.  For 
convenience, we name each mechanism: (1) informa-
tion mechanism; (2) social recognition mechanism; 
and (3) mediation mechanism.  From these three 
mechanisms, this section derives six testable hypoth-
eses that allow us to explain the positive impact of the 
JICA interventions on the efficiency of Iraqi officials’ 
work.
Information Mechanism
In order to overcome a lack of knowledge and conduct 
capacity building, JICA increased interactions with 
Iraqi officials.  Although interactions can be defined in 
many ways, we focus on the following two aspects of 
interactions: the quality and quantity of interactions. 
While we expect the increase in interactions and in-
formation provision to generally lead to an increase 
in work efficiency of Iraqi officials, the following ques-
tion remains: quality or quantity, which is more impor-
tant in this monitoring process?
The debate of quality vs. quantity in educational 
study has a long history (e.g., Ng 2008).  Theoretically 
speaking, a significant body of educational literature 
argues that the quality, not just quantity, of educa-
tion matters to improve economic performance (e.g., 
Hanushek and Woessmann 2007), therefore both high 
quality and quantity of monitoring are expected to in-
crease Iraqi officials’ work effectiveness.
Note that although it is reported that an increase in 
the quantity of work is sometimes detrimental to work 
efficiency (e.g., Barling, Rogers, and Kelloway 2006), 
the current analysis uses the term quantity as the 
amount of communications rather than the amount 
of work JICA/Iraqi officials complete.  We thus expect 
that an increase in communication levels between 
JICA and Iraqi officials can reduce misunderstanding 
between them, while Iraqi officials can accumulate 
knowledge through frequent consultation with JICA. 
Likewise, JICA improved the content of monitoring 
and gave more detailed feedback to Iraqi officials in 
order to help them learn how to manage their proj-
ects.  From this, if our expectations were true, we 
should observe a positive impact out of both quality 
and quantity of interactions:8 
H1: An increase in monitoring quantity leads to higher 
efficiency in project management.
H2: An increase in monitoring quality leads to higher 
efficiency in project management.
12 GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Social Recognition Mechanism
A large body of the public administration literature 
indicates that good managers make positive change 
happen in their organizations (Fernandez and Rainey 
2006).  Thus, the introduction of the multilayer 
monitoring system involving influential Iraqi high-
level authorities, such as prime minister’s Advisory 
Commission, should result in positive changes.  The 
existence of influential high-level authorities, how-
ever, tells us little about how they facilitate Iraqi of-
ficials becoming more efficient in terms of project 
management.  To understand the mechanism behind 
this theory, this paper focuses on an evaluation sys-
tem involving the high-level authority.
JICA/UNDP publishes a project-entity ranking based 
on their performance every year.  Using the rank-
ing, the high-level authority in Iraq praises project 
entities that performed well, while they give critical 
comments to project entities that did not.  In develop-
ment economics, some scholars find that provision of 
performance-linked financial incentives can motivate 
greater effort and improve performance in a public 
service provision (Duflo et al. 2007).  On the other 
hand, there is also evidence suggesting that relying on 
non-pecuniary incentives that come from social rec-
ognition, appreciation or sanction can be more effec-
tive to motivate public workers (Alcazar et al. 2006). 
Accordingly, in the case of JICA’s intervention, we 
can see the impact of social recognition in two differ-
ent ways.  First, project entities that received good 
evaluation were more motivated to work efficiently, 
since they wanted to keep their good record and be 
recognized as good project entities by the high-level 
authority, (which also may lead to an increase in their 
budget and/or individual promotion in the long term). 
By contrast, project entities that received bad evalu-
ation also had an incentive to work more efficiently 
since they wanted to avoid social and financial pun-
ishment in the short and long term (poorly perform-
ing PMTs might face a budget cut and also risk being 
recognized as inefficient by government officials). 
From this, we can summarize the social recognition 
mechanism and draw the following two competing 
hypotheses:
H3: A better evaluation leads to higher efficiency in 
project management. 
H4: A worse evaluation leads to higher efficiency in 
project management.
Mediation Mechanism
The third mechanism lies with the presence of the 
UNDP.  JICA initially asked UNDP to assist in their 
work with Iraqi officials due to security risks in the 
country.  According to interviews we conducted in 
June 2012, the presence of UNDP seems to have two 
positive impacts on the work efficiency of project 
entities.  First, we observed that since UNDP officials 
could move more easily across the country, the intro-
duction of UNDP facilitated project management – it 
is only natural that face-to-face interactions resulted 
in more efficient project management.  Second, since 
Iraqi officials consider UNDP a neutral third party, the 
Iraqi officials seemed to have more frank conversa-
tions with UNDP officials, leading to early detection 
of problems and more efficient project management.
Brown and Ayres (1994) argue that a neutral third 
party can mitigate inefficiency caused by miscommu-
nication between two parties if the third party can di-
rectly observe each party’s behavior and disclose it to 
both groups.  Indeed, as a neutral party, UNDP is well 
placed to have access to both parties’ information and 
utilize it to solve miscommunication.  However, the 
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involvement of UNDP can be a double-edged sword 
since Iraqi officials may end up relying on UNDP more 
than JICA, which leads to an adverse coordination 
problem among the three organizations, and/or the 
amount of work may increase, as Iraqi officials have to 
work for both UNDP and JICA.  From this, we can de-
rive two competing hypotheses in terms of the pres-
ence of UNDP:
H5: The presence of a third party leads to higher ef-
ficiency in project management. 
H6: The presence of a third party leads to lower effi-
ciency in project management.
Table 2 summarizes the observational implications. 
The next section introduces our research design to 
test the hypotheses. 
Table 2: Three Mechanisms and Observational Implications
Information Mechanism Social Recognition Mechanism Mediation Mechanism
Variation Quantity vs. Quality
Positive Evaluation vs. 
Negative Evaluation
UNDP vs. Non-UNDP
14 GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
Research Design
The most challenging task for evaluating the hypoth-
eses is that we do not have appropriate counterfactu-
als to estimate the impact of JICA’s intervention on 
the effectiveness of the Iraqi government.  We thus 
believe that potential endogeneity issues arise from 
omitted variables, and some variables certainly lead 
to bias in our estimates.  For instance, we suspect mo-
tivation is an endogenous variable – more motivated 
project entities should result in both better evaluation 
and higher efficiency, leading to a biased estimator.
With that caveat in mind, we first compare a treat-
ment group and a control group for each hypothesis. 
More specifically, for each hypothesis, we create a 
quasi-treatment group with the best three PMTs and 
a quasi-control group with the worst three PMTs.  For 
instance, to assess the information mechanism hy-
potheses, we pick three PMTs that have received most 
interactions and three other PMTs that have received 
the fewest interactions, and compare the effective-
ness of their work between them.
Next, although the data limitation does not allow us 
to assess all the hypotheses, we employ a regression 
analysis to corroborate the exercise.  The regression 
analysis employs panel data to minimize the potential 
bias due to omitted characteristics, while we include 
a number of important control variables such as mo-
tivation to help us isolate the main mechanism dis-
cussed in the paper.  The unit of panel-data analysis 
is project-year with an observational period between 
2010 and 2012.  
Data
We employ the data that JICA and UNDP collected. 
Our main dependent variable — and the way we opera-
tionalize effectiveness — is “submission delay.”  The 
variable measures how long, on average, each PMT 
takes to finish its requirement in a given year.  More 
specifically, each PMT is supposed to submit a report 
every month and we note the difference between the 
expected submission date and the actual submission 
date.  We employ an annual average time lapse be-
tween expected submission dates and actual dates 
each year. 
To test the first two hypotheses (Information 
Mechanism: Quantity vs. Quality), we first employ the 
“frequency” variable, coding how often JICA/UNDP 
officials have contact with each PMT.  To collect the 
data, we conducted a survey and asked each official 
“On average, how often do you work with the PMT 
that you are in charge of in a month’s time?”  The 
response is a five-point scale with a higher value indi-
cating more frequent communication.  Next, in order 
to measure the quality of interactions, we employ 
the amount of feedback JICA gives Iraqi officials as 
a proxy (the “feedback” variable).  More specifically, 
we count how many items JICA corrected on reports 
submitted by Iraqi officials.  We expect that the more 
feedback a PMT receives, the more efficient it be-
comes over time.
Turning to the second set of hypotheses (Social 
Recognition Mechanism: Positive vs. Negative), we 
employ the “ranking” variable, flagging which PMT 
receives positive or negative recognition by the high-
level authority.
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Finally, to test the third set of hypotheses (Mediation 
Mechanism: UNDP vs. Not UNDP), we use a dummy 
variable that codes 1 if UNDP is involved in a PMT’s 
projector 0 if they are not.
To minimize the danger that our results could suffer 
from omitted variable bias, the regression analysis 
also includes a set of control variables plausibly as-
sociated with both the dependent and independent 
variables: “motivation,” measuring if a PMT is more 
motivated for the work; and “project scale,” measur-
ing variation in project scale among PMTs.  Although 
it is difficult to measure motivations, we use how well 
each PMT is organized as a proxy for whether a PMT is 
committed to the project, what we call organizational 
motivation.  We expect that if a PMT is well set-up in 
the first place, it means that the overseeing ministry 
for the PMT is more motivated for the project and the 
PMT thus has to be motivated as well.  We also use a 
time dummy variable to control for temporal depen-
dence.  Finally, we use a one-year lag of our depen-
dent variable.  This way, we believe we can estimate 
the effects of independent variables on subsequent 
efficiency increases in the Iraqi government.  The fol-
lowing equation summarizes our basic specification:
∆Submission Delay
it 
= α + β1 Feedbackit-1 + β2Rankingit-1 
+ β3Motivationit-1 + β4ProjectScaleit-1 + β5Fixed Effectsi 
+ ε
i
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of variables 
used for the analyses.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Submission Delay 24 -0.340 5.59 -19.00 9.45
Frequency 15 3.217 0.89 1.50 4.75
Feedback 36 3.205 1.99 0.67 7.33
Ranking 24 6.500 3.53 1.00 12.00
Motivation 27 4.000 2.16 0.00 6.00
ln(Planned Disbursement) 22 21.309 1.29 19.13 23.66
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RESULTS
First, we report our counterfactual analyses by us-
ing the data with a format of project-month.9  Figure 
5 compares PMTs that have more frequent contacts 
with JICA/UNDP with the counterparts that have less 
frequent interactions.  The figure shows that there 
is no significant difference between the high contact 
group and the low contact group in terms of submis-
sion rate, indicating that the impact of frequent con-
tact is not substantial.
Turning to the quality of information, Figure 6 com-
pares PMTs that have more feedback with those who 
have less feedback from JICA/UNDP.  According to the 
figure, we can see that those that have received less 
feedback are generally more likely to submit required 
documents on time than those who have received 
more feedback, suggesting that giving feedback is 
indeed detrimental to work effectiveness of Iraqi of-
ficials.
Figure 5: Comparison in Terms of Frequency in 2012
Source: JICA.
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Figure 7 compares PMTs that received the best 
evaluation in 2011 with those that received the worst 
evaluation in 2011.  The figure demonstrates that the 
project entities that received a good evaluation are 
generally more likely to sustain a good level of work 
effectiveness except in the month of July.
Finally, although the monthly data are not available, 
we attempt to evaluate the mediation hypotheses by 
comparing PMTs that work with UNDP with those who 
do not work with UNDP.  Specifically, we use average 
number of days taken by JICA to review bidding docu-
ments submitted by each PMT.  According to the data, 
whereas the PMTs with UNDP improved their work ef-
fectiveness by about 15 days, the PMTs without UNDP 
slowed down the process by 34 days.10
In sum, we have so far found that the quality of in-
teraction may be more important than the quantity 
of communications, and positive evaluation is more 
effective than negative evaluation.  Yet, since it is a 
bivariate analysis and focuses on a trend only in 2012, 
Figure 6: Comparison in Terms of Feedback in 2012
Source: JICA.
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we suspect that the analysis cannot detect a more 
long-term impact of the JICA interventions on the ef-
fectiveness of Iraqi officials’ work.  For example, it may 
be that those who receive less feedback work better 
now because they might have received more feedback 
intensively over the previous years.  Similarly, it may 
be that positive evaluation is more effective because 
those who received a positive evaluation in 2011 might 
have received a negative evaluation in previous years, 
and therefore might have worked to gain their reputa-
tion.
In order to address the concern, we next conduct a 
time-series analysis.  Although the data cover only 
a three year period, we anticipate detecting a more 
general impact of the JICA projects on the work ef-
fectiveness of Iraqi officials.  The empirical results in 
Table 3 display the estimated coefficient of the regres-
sion analyses.  Due to lack of available variables, we 
could only employ the feedback and ranking variables 
among the explanatory variables of interest, but could 
not include the frequency and UNDP variables.  As for 
our dependent variable, we used the same variable of 
Figure 7: Comparison in Terms of Social Recognition in 2012
Source: JICA.
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submission delay as the previous analysis.  Further, 
the analysis suffers from a small sample size (N=17). 
As for the model specifications, Model 1 uses a cross-
sectional analysis with controls variables such as 
motivation to see whether we can replicate the previ-
ous bivariate analysis.  Model 2 employs a time-series 
analysis with the same control variables as Model 1.11
First, Model 1 shows that, controlling for other vari-
ables, the feedback variable shows a positive sign 
instead of a negative sign found by the previous bivar-
iate analysis.  This is confirmed by a time-series analy-
sis in Model 2.  Model 2 shows that, all else equal, the 
feedback variable is statistically significant and has 
a positive impact on submission.  This is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, suggesting that those who receive 
more feedback are in general more likely to increase 
their work effectiveness.  Combined with Figure 6, we 
can infer that PMTs that have received more feedback 
will improve their work effectiveness and become less 
dependent on JICA/UNDP over time.
As for the ranking variable, Model 1 and Model 2 
both report a negative sign, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 4, but the significance level is not suffi-
cient to reject the null hypothesis in the time-series 
analysis.  Although we need to wait to make a final 
judgment until we collect more data, the analysis sug-
gests that those who receive negative evaluation in 
the previous year may be more likely to improve their 
work effectiveness.
Table 4: Regression Analysis
Variables Submission Delay
(1) (2)
Frequency 2.623
(3.064)
Feedback 1.950 2.352***
(3.515) (0.741)
Ranking -0.728 -0.087
(0.988) (0.270)
Motivation -0.007 0.295
(1.356) (0.269)
ln(Planned Disbursement) 0.780 0.517***
(2.729) (0.116)
Constant -22.239 1.507
(72.395) (11.198)
Observations 8 17
R-squared 0.577 0.791
Controls Y Y
Time-Series N Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CONCLUSION
Although we still need to do a follow-up analysis with 
more data, we believe that the findings of this research 
suggest an important lesson for post-conflict or frag-
ile states on effective implementation of large-scale 
aid and governance projects.  Countries in transition 
often go through periods of upheaval and weak gover-
nance,  and Iraq is a prime example.  Donors may hesi-
tate to implement large-scale projects in post-conflict 
or post-revolution situations due to security concerns 
and underdeveloped bureaucratic capacity of recipi-
ent states. Nonetheless, by using the successful case 
of JICA projects in Iraq, this paper showed that large-
scale projects can work in a post-conflict society and 
increase recipient officials’ capacity to implement aid 
effectively. This suggests that donors should not with-
draw their support in difficult post-conflict situations. 
Given that this is the time when donor engagement is 
most crucial, the JICA example offers three ways to 
manage aid in such circumstances.
In this paper, we first proposed three baseline mecha-
nisms – information mechanism; social recognition 
mechanism; and mediation mechanism – to explain 
the positive impact on project effectiveness in a post-
conflict society.  Drawing on previous studies, the 
paper then derived six testable hypotheses from the 
three mechanisms.
In the empirical sections, we tested the six hypoth-
eses.  First, we found that project entities that have 
received more feedback from JICA/UNDP tend to 
improve their work effectiveness over time, while 
the number of interactions or communications may 
not be as important an indicator as the quality of in-
teractions.  This suggests that the quality of donor 
intervention leads to more positive results than the 
quantity of intervention.  Second, the findings show 
that the more negative evaluations a project entity 
has received in the past year, the more likely their 
work effectiveness is to increase.  The results imply 
that the social recognition mechanism works better 
for those who receive negative evaluations than those 
who receive positive evaluations.  In other words, 
PMTs work more effectively when they receive “bad“ 
social recognition.  Third, because we could not con-
duct a panel-data analysis for the mediation mecha-
nism, the empirical result for the UNDP involvement 
should be interpreted as largely descriptive.  Yet, since 
we cannot reasonably find alternative explanations 
for the positive results of the PMTs with UNDP, and 
those who work with UNDP should have had more dif-
ficulty in conducting their projects in the first place, 
we believe that the presence of UNDP increased work 
effectiveness and the conclusion will not change even 
with multivariate analysis.
In sum, the paper finds that donors may be able to 
increase the work effectiveness to a level able to sup-
port large-scale projects even in a post-conflict coun-
try if (1) they are committed to interacting with local 
officials and giving detailed comments on how they 
can facilitate their projects on their own; (2) a local 
high-level authority monitors local officials’ work and 
creates a culture where bad-performing officials are 
not allowed to continue work; and/or (3) a third-party 
international organization facilitates communication 
between the donor and the recipient. 
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ENDNOTES
1. The polity score codes the qualities of democratic 
and autocratic authorities for each country, every 
year between 1800 and 2010.  It ranges from 10 
(consolidated democracy) to -10 (hereditary mon-
archy).  We define “weak governments” as coun-
tries whose polity score is in the 25th percentile.
2. The concept of governance captures “the manner 
in which power is exercised in the management 
of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development” (Santiso 1992: 1).
3. Their argument is been scrutinized and chal-
lenged by a number of scholars (e.g., Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman 2004).
4. It is true that some scholars argue that aid helps 
the dramatic recovery of conflict-torn societies. 
For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that 
aid leads to economic growth in post-conflict so-
cieties.  Yet their findings also need to be framed 
within a context: aid in conjunction with good 
policies has a positive effect on growth. The study 
also suffers from an endogeneity problem of the 
so-called phoenix factor (for example, see Kang 
and Meernik (2005)).
5. U.S. provides exceptionally large amounts of tech-
nical cooperation aid and grant; we omit the data 
from the analysis as outliers.
6. In each step of procurement, JICA requires proj-
ect entities to submit procurement documents 
and reviews the documents against JICA’s pro-
curement guidelines, which indicates basic guid-
ance in international bid procedure.  PQ Docs 
Average Lapse and Bidding Docs Average Lapse 
mean days taken by JICA for review of prequalifi-
cation documents and bid documents, respective-
ly.   In case of PQ result and Bidding result, JICA 
reviews evaluation process and result described 
in the evaluation documents.
7. We attempt to match time horizons (X-axis in Fig-
ure 3), as projects periods of the JICA and World 
Bank are not exactly same.
8. Since high quantity of JICA intervention can be 
correlated with high quality of JICA intervention, 
we may not be able to disentangle two hypoth-
eses.  Yet, we can exploit variation in our data on 
JICA interventions – project entities that receive 
higher quality of JICA intervention are not the 
same entities that receive higher quantity of JICA 
intervention.
9. We removed two projects from the analyses as 
outliers because they skew the results.
10. We used the following review processes for the 
analysis: bidding document review and bidding 
evaluation review.
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